Abstract Let 5 be a Boolean algebra; let Π be a set of relative (= conditional) probability functions on S, and IT a set of absolute ones; and let V be A Π A, with A here an arbitrary but fixed member of S. (i) A function P' in IT is then the V-restriction of a function P in Π (= P has P' as its K-restriction) if V(A) = P(,4, V) for each A in S; and (ii) the functions in Π relativize those in IT if each function in Π has one in IT as its Γ-restriction and each function in IT is the K-restriction of one in Π. Considered in the paper are two sets of absolute probability functions (Kolmogorov's and Carnap's, the latter like Kolmogorov's except for P(>1) equaling 1 only when A = V), and ten sets of relative ones (among them Popper's, Renyi's, Carnap's, and Kolmogorov's, the last thus called because of their relationship to Kolmogorov's absolute functions). And it is determined which sets of relative functions relativize which sets of absolute ones. S is then allowed to be an arbitrary set, and Popper's relative probability functions on such a set are shown to relativize his absolute ones.
Introduction
Let S be a set closed under the unary function -and the binary one Π; let Π be a set of relative (hence, binary) probability functions defined on S and IT a set of absolute (hence, unary) ones 1 ; and, for some arbitrary but fixed A in S, let Fbe A Π A. We say that a function P' in W is the V-restriction of α function P in Π-hence, that P has P' as its V-restriction -if for any A in S
?'(A) = ?(A 9 V).
And, possibly meaning more by the verb than Popper did, we say that the functions in Π relatiυize those in IF if (i) each function in Π has one in IT as its F-restriction, and (ii) each function in IF is the F-restriction of one in Π.
The second of these conditions formalizes Renyi's requirement in [12] that absolute probability functions be special cases of the relative ones that relativize them.
As might be expected, Popper's relative probability functions in Appendix *v of [11] relativize his absolute ones in [9] , a fact that we establish in Section 8 of the paper. But they do not relativize Kolmogorov's absolute probability functions in [5] , because Popper's relative probability functions are defined on arbitrary sets whereas Kolmogorov's absolute ones are defined on fields only, a special kind of Boolean algebra defined in Section 2. To permit a comparison of Popper's probability functions with those of Renyi's (defined on fields only) and those of Carnap's (defined on Boolean algebras of propositions), and to facilitate the proof of various other relativization theorems, we shall presume Popper's functions to be defined in Sections 3-7 on Boolean algebras only. The absolute probability functions thus defined are -it so happens -those of Kolmogorov in [5] , but made to suit all Boolean algebras rather than just fields. As for the relative ones they are of particular significance, as we indicate in Section 8 and more fully document in [14] . Isolated from the rest of Popper's relative probability functions, they might earn Popper the recognition that more traditional probability theorists still deny him.
In Sections 5 and 6 we will be considering, besides Popper's absolute probability functions, those of Carnap found in 2 of [4] , made to suit all Boolean algebras rather than just those of propositions. And considered in Sections 3 to 6, besides Popper's relative probability functions, will be those of Renyi found in [12] , the paper mentioned in Popper's footnote, and those of Carnap in 2 of [4] . We adapt the functions in question so they will be total rather than partial, and so they will suit all Boolean algebras. 2 As Popper noted in the first case, and as we shall establish in both, Renyi's relative probability functions are but some of Popper's, and Carnap's relative probability functions are but some of Renyi's. That Carnap's absolute probability functions are but some of Popper's will be obvious from the account given below of those functions.
It is an easy matter to prove, as we do in Section 6, that (a) Popper's relative probability functions relativize Popper's -hence, Kolmogorov's -absolute ones, and (b) Carnap's relative probability functions relativize -indeed, match one-to-one -Carnap's absolute ones.
Our proof of (a) readily generalizes in Section 2 to suit Popper's functions as he intended them, i.e., defined on arbitrary sets. More arduous is proving, as we also do, that (c) Renyi's relative probability functions also relativize Popper's -hence, Kolmogorov's -absolute probability functions, and (d) the rest of Popper's relative probability functions relativize those among
Popper's -hence, those among Kolmogorov's -absolute probability functions that are not Carnap ones.
And it may come as a surprise (as it did to us) that, different though Renyi's functions are from the rest of Popper's relative probability functions, each of Popper's -hence each of Kolmogorov's -absolute probability functions is the K-restriction of one or more Renyi functions and, when not a Carnap function, of one or more non-Renyi ones as well. Lastly, considered in Section 7 are relative probability functions that are mentioned in many texts, but dismissively as a rule. Partial functions like them, but defined on fields only, appear in [5] , where Kolmogorov calls them "conditional" probability functions. Among the extensions of these to full functions they are the only ones that match one-to-one Kolmogorov's absolute probability functions. So, for lack of a better name, we call them relative probability functions in the sense of Kolmogorov. They are Popper functions, and those among them that are Renyi functions coincide with Carnap's functions. They well deserve, we believe, the attention we accord them here.
Boolean algebras
Let 5 be a nonempty set closed under -and Π. We say that the triple <5,-,Π> constitutes a Boolean algebra-or, more informally, that A1-A5 are known as the postulates for Boolean Algebra. If a certain step in a proof below follows by one or more of A1-A5, we shall usually say that it does so by BA and move on.
We take the relation designated in A1-A5 by '=' to be the identity relation. So, when P in Sections 3 to 7 is an absolute or a relative probability function on S, P(,4) will automatically equal P(A') if A = A', and P(A,B) will automatically equal P(A',B') if B = B' as well. As we took the so-called unit element V to be A Π A for some arbitrary but fixed A in S, so we take the zero element A to be A Π A for that very A. Note, though, that AΠA =A by A3, and hence yl 0^=505 = 00^ = ... by A3 again. So V = A Γ) A and A = A Γ) A for ίwy ^4 in S. The present account of a Boolean algebra, by the way, is consistent with its having just one member, in which case of course A and A have to be the same. Most writers demand in consequence that a Boolean algebra have at least two members. Thanks to the constraints placed on the probability functions considered here, our S will have that minimum number of members.
When a Boolean algebra consists of sets, and the functions -and Π defined on S are the set theoretic complementation and intersection, 5 is usually called afield of sets or-for short, as in Section 1 -afield. Under such circumstances the unit element becomes the universal set and the zero element the empty set. The Boolean algebras given in Table 5 (see Note 7 ) and in Table 6 are fields.
Note that whereas a finite Boolean algebra can only be of cardinality 2 n for some n (n > 0), an infinite one can be of any infinite cardinality. However, since Carnap's probability functions cannot be defined on all nondenumerable Boolean algebras, we shall limit ourselves in this paper to denumerable ones.
Relative probability functions
Let S (together with -and Π) be a Boolean algebra.
Definition 3.1
By a Popper relative probability function on S we understand any function P from S x S into the reals that meets these five constraints:
Bl
For some A and some B in S, P(A,B) Φ 1 B2
For any A and B in 5, 0 < P(A,B)
For any A, B, and C in S, P(y4 Π B,C) = P(A,B Π C) X P(B,C) PB5 For any A and B in S, if Έ>(C,B) Ψ 1 for some C in S, then P(A 9 B) = The letter 'P' in TB5' signals that the constraint, due to Popper himself, is peculiar to his functions. Due to Al and our understanding of =, the two additional constraints that appear in some characterizations of Popper's functions, when these are defined on arbitrary sets, to wit:
For any A 9 B, and C in S, P(A Π B, C) = P(B Π A 9 By a Renyi relative probability function on S we understand any function P from S x S into the reals that meets constraints B1-B4 of Definition 3.1 plus this fifth one:
RB5
For any A and B in S, if B Φ Λ, then P(A 9 B) = 1 -P(A 9 B).
The letter *R' in 'RB5' signals that the constraint, equivalent to one used by Renyi, is peculiar to his functions. 3 A Renyi function on the set {A 9 a 9 ά 9 V] is displayed on p. 490.
By a Carnap relative probability function on S we understand any Renyi one on S that meets this extra constraint:
The letter *C in *CB7' signals that the constraint, equivalent to one used by Carnap, is peculiar to his functions. 4 (A constraint RB6 will turn up shortly.) A Carnap function on {A 9 a 9 a 9 V] is displayed on p. 491. 5 
Some facts about the probability functions of Section 3
Note All lemmas appealed to in this section and in Sections 6 to 8 are recorded and proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 1
Let P be a relative probability function of Renyi's on S. 
Theorem 3
Camap's relative probability functions on S are those, and only those, among Renyϊs relative probability functions on S that meet CB7.
Proof: By definition.
This result too would be otiose were all Renyi functions Carnap ones, but the function P in Table 2 on the set {A 9 a 9 a, V] is our promised evidence to the contrary. It is a Renyi function that does not meet CB7, and hence is not a Carnap function. Given Theorem 2, Carnap's relative probability functions are consequently those, and only those, among Popper's functions that meet RB6 and CB7. This characterization can be sharpened, by the way. In virtue of Lemma 3 any Popper relative probability function P that meets CB7 also meets this constraint:
If P(A 9 B) = 1, then B=A 9 hence this one:
There is an A in S such that if ?(A,B) = 1, then B = Λ, hence RB6. So:
Theorem 4
Carnap's relative probability functions on S are those, and only those, among Popper's relative probability functions on S that meet CB7.
The function P on the set {Λ,a,β,V) in Table 3 is a Carnap function. The relationships between Popper's, Renyi's, and Carnap's relative probability functions may be portrayed as in Figure 1 5 Absolute probability functions Let S be a Boolean algebra.
Definition 5.1
By a Popper absolute probability function on S we understand any function P from S into the reals that meets these three constraints:
Cl For any A in S, 0 < P(^4) C2 P(F) = 1 C3 For any A and B in S, Έ>(A) = P(A Π B) + Y(A Π B). 6 Due to A1-A3 and our understanding of =, automatically met here are three additional constraints that appear in some characterizations of Popper's functions, when these are defined on arbitrary sets, to wit: Note that by C3, a constraint that is also met by Carnap's absolute probability functions, P(,4) = P(^4 Π A) + PG4 Π Λ). But A = ,4 Π A by A3, and hence P(.4) = P(A Π ,4). So P(Λ) = 0. But P(F) = 1 by C2, a constraint also met by Carnap's functions. So, S is again compelled to have at least two members. Popper's absolute probability functions on our set [Λ,a,a 9 V] arc all results of entering a nonnegαtive real, not exceeding 1, for r in Table 4 . 
The first letter 'C in 'CC4' signals that the constraint, equivalent to one used by Carnap, is peculiar to his functions. Carnap's absolute probability functions on [A,a 9 a,V] are all results of entering a nonzero real smaller than 1 for r in the preceding table.
The relativίzation theorems
We first establish that Renyi's -and hence, Popper's -relative probability functions relativize Popper's absolute ones.
Theorem 5
Let P be a relative probability function of Popper's on S. Then the V-restriction P' of 'P is an absolute probability function of Popper's on 5.
Proof: 0 < P(Λ, V) by B2, P(F, K) = 1 by B3, and P(Λ, F) = P(Λ Π £, F) + P(,4 Π B 9 V) by Lemma 2(f) and Lemma 2(k). So, P' meets each of C1-C3. So P' is an absolute probability function of Popper's on S.
Thus each of Popper's -and hence, each of Renyi's -relative probability functions has an absolute probability function of Popper's as its F-restriction.
Note as regards the definition of P in the next theorem that when B Φ A, P'c(B) ΦOby CC4. 9 ifB Φ A but Pf>(#) = 0.
Theorem 6 Let Pp be an absolute probability function of Popper's on S, let Pc be an absolute one of Carnap's on S, and let P be this function on S: h,ifB = Λ P(A,B) = <Έ>ί>(A ΠB)/P{>(B) 9 if B Φ A andP^(B) Φθ
[P'C(A Π B)/P' C (B)
Then: (a) P is a relative probability function of Renyi's on S; (b) P has Pp as its V-restriction.
Proof of (a): That P meets each of B1-B4 and RB5, and hence is a relative probability function of Renyi's on S, is established by cases. Thus, each of Popper's absolute probability functions is the F-restriction of a Renyi relative probability function. So:
Theorem 7
RenyVs relative probability functions on S relativize Popper's (and hence, Kolmogorov's) absolute probability functions on S. 8 But each of Popper's absolute probability functions, being the F-restriction of a Renyi relative probability function, is of course that of a Popper one. So:
Theorem 8
Popper's relative probability functions on S relativize Popper's (and hence, Kolmogorov's) absolute probability functions on S. Unlike Renyi's relative probability functions, which relativize all of Popper's absolute probability functions, the rest of Popper's relative probability functions relativize those only that are not Carnap ones. In virtue of Theorem 5, any relative probability function of Popper's that is not a Renyi one has an absolute probability function P' of Popper's as its F-restriction. But that P' cannot be a Carnap function. Indeed, since P is not a Renyi function, P by Definition 3.3 of Section 3 is not a Carnap one either. So, P does not meet CB7, and as a result P' does not meet CC4. Thus, those among Popper's relative probability functions that are not Renyi ones have as their F-restrictions those, but only those, among Popper's absolute probability functions that are not Carnap ones.
Our next theorem exploits the fact that if a Renyi relative probability function P R is not a Carnap one, then there is at least one B in S such that P R (B, V) = 0 and yet B Φ A. It delivers, we shall see, our second result on the relativization of Kolmogorov's absolute probability functions.
Theorem 9
Let P R be a relative probability function of Renyi's on S that is not a Carnap one, and let P R be this function on S:
Then: (a) P R is a relative probability function of Popper's on S; (b) P R is not a Renyi one; (c) P R has the same V-restriction as P R .
Proof of (a): That P R meets each of B1-B4 and PB5, and hence is a Popper relative probability function on S, is established by cases. Case 1: P R (F, V) Φ 0 by B3, and P R (Λ, V) Φ 1 by Lemma 2(k) and Lemma 2(h). So, P R meets Bl. Case 2: P R automatically meets B2 when P R (£, V) = 0, and does so by B2 in the contrary case. Case 3: P R automatically meets B3 when P R (^4, F) = 0, and does so by B3 in the contrary case. Case 4: That P R meets B4 is trivially true when P R (C, V) = 0 and hence
by Lemma 2(1), hence P R (A Π B,C) = P R (B,C) = 0, and hence P R again meets B4. Suppose, on the other hand, that P R (C, V) Φ 0 and P R (B ΠC,V) Φ 0. Then P R automatically meets B4. Case 5: Suppose B is P R -normal. Then P R (B, V) Φ 0, hence B is P R -normal, and hence PR automatically meets PB5.
Proof of (b): Since P R is not a Carnap function, there is a B in S such that P R (B, V) = 0 while B Φ Λ, hence there is a B in S such that P R (A,B) = 1 for every A in S while B Φ Λ, hence P R does not meet PB6, and hence by Theorem 2 P R is not a Renyi function.
Proof of (c): Since P R (F, V) Φ 0 by B3, P R (,4, V) = P R (A, V) for every A in S, and hence P R and P R have the same F-restriction. Now let P' be any Popper absolute probability function that is not a Carnap one. By virtue of Theorem 6 there is a Renyi relative probability function P R that has P' as its F-restriction. But P R cannot be a Carnap function: if it met CB7, then P' would meet CC4, which by hypothesis it cannot do. So, P' is the F-restriction of a Renyi relative probability function that is not a Carnap one. Thus, by virtue of Theorem 9, P' is also the F-restriction of a Popper relative probability function that is not a Renyi one. So
Theorem 10
Those among Popper's relative probability functions on S that are not Renyi ones relativize those, but only those, among Popper's (and hence, Kolmogorov's) absolute probability functions on S that are not Carnap ones.
We promised to prove yet another relativization theorem in Section 6, one concerning Carnap's functions. By virtue of Theorem 5 any relative probability function P of Carnap's has as its F-restriction an absolute probability function P' of Popper's, one which must meet CC4 (If P'(A) = 0, then A =Λ) since P meets CB7 (If P(A, V) = 0, then A = A), and hence which must be an absolute probability function of Carnap's. Now let P' be an arbitrary absolute probability function of Carnap's, and let P be this function:
The proof that P meets B1-B5 and has P' as its F-restriction can be retrieved from the proof of Theorem 5. But by CC4 A = A if P'(^4) = 0, hence by BA if P'(/l Π F) = 0, and hence by C2 if P(A, V) = 0. So P meets CB7 as well, and hence P is a Carnap relative probability function. Hence
Theorem 11
Carnap's relative probability functions on S relativize his absolute ones on S.
This result can be strengthened, as indicated earlier. Suppose indeed that the foregoing function P' were the F-restriction of two distinct relative ones P! and P 2 , and suppose first that B = A. Then by Lemma 1
P ι (A,B)=? 2 (A 9 B)
for any A in S. Suppose next that B Φ A. Then P x (B, V) Φ 0 and P 2 (£, V) Φ 0 by CB7, and hence by Lemma 2(1)
But, since P! and P 2 both have P' as their F-restriction,
FxiAΠBtV) =V 2 (A C\B,V)
and
P ι (B,V)=P 2 (B,V).
Hence, again,
for any A in S. So P! and P 2 would be the same function, contrary to the original supposition. But by definition a relative probability function has a single absolute one as its F-restriction, and by the foregoing argument a Carnap absolute probability function is the F-restriction of a single relative one. So
Theorem 12
Carnap's relative probability functions on S and his absolute ones on S match one-to-one.
Indeed, as the definition above of P(A 9 B) reveals, Carnap's relative probability functions are simply his absolute ones couched in two-argument idiom. 7 Kolmogorov relative probability functions Let S be a Boolean algebra. By a relative probability function on S in Kolmogorov 9 s sense we understand any Popper one on 5 that meets this extra constraint:
KB8 For any A in S, if P(A 9 V) = 0, then P(Λ,A) = 1.
Theorem 13
Let P be a relative probability function on S in Kolmogorov's sense. Hence:
Theorem 14
Let P be a relative probability function on S in Kolmogorov's sense, and P' be the V-restriction of P. Then:
Given a Kolmogorov (hence, a Popper) absolute probability function P' on a Boolean algebra 5, a number of writers -Kolmogorov among themabridge the quotient
for any B in S such that P' of B Φ 0, and they refer to P as a conditional (i.e., relative) probability function on S. As announced on p. 487 and recorded in Theorem 14, a relative probability function in Kolmogorov's sense is an extension of their partial function P to any B in S such that P' (B) = 0, with P(A 9 B) set at 1 for that B. Full Kolmogorov functions of the present sort are considered in Section 55 of [2] and Section 1 of [9] , but they antedate both Carnap and Popper.
Some, but only some, of Kolmogorov's relative probability functions are Renyi functions, and as reported in Section 1 those that are coincide with Carnap's functions. Consider indeed a relative probability function P in Kolmogorov's sense that meets RB6, and suppose P(B, V) = 0. Then P(A,B) = 1 for every A in S by Theorem 13(a), and hence B = A by RB6. So P, if it meets RB6 and hence is a Renyi function, meets CB7 and hence is a Carnap one. But, as we saw in Section 4, any relative probability function of Carnap's is a Renyi one. So
Theorem 15
Those among Kolmogorov's relative probability functions on S that are Renyi ones are those, and only those, among Renyi's functions that are Carnap ones.
For instance, the function P in Table 3 is a Kolmogorov function: Έ>(A,B) = 1 for every A in {Λ,a,a, V] whenever P(B 9 V) = 0. It is also a Renyi one: P(B, V) = 0 (and hence, P(A 9 B) = 1 for every A in the set) only when B is A. So, by Theorem 15, P is a Carnap function, as was indicated in Section 4. On the other hand, the function P in Table 5 is a Renyi function that is not a Carnap one. So, by Theorem 15, P is not a Kolmogorov function. Indeed, P(B 9 V) = 0 when i?is either A or a, but P(A 9 B) = 1 for every A in [A 9 a 9 ά 9 V] only when B is A.
As only some of Renyi's functions are relative probability functions in Kolmogorov's sense, so only some of Popper's functions that are not Renyi ones are relative probability functions in that sense. For instance, the function P in Table 1 is a Kolmogorov function that is not a Renyi one, as the reader may verify. But the function P on the eight-membered set [A 9 a 9 b 9 c 9 a 9 b 9 c 9 V] in Table 5 is a Popper function that is neither a Renyi function (P(A 9 B) = 1 for every A in the set when B is a) nor a Kolmogorov one (when B is either b or c, P(B 9 V) = 0 and yet P(A 9 B) Φ 1 for at least one A in the set). Members a 9 b 9 and c of the present set are to be understood respectively as {e\}, \e{\ 9 and [e 3 ] (e Ϊ9 e 2 , and e 3 any three distinct elements you please), and hence ά, b 9 and c understood respectively as {e 2 , β 3 }, {e\, e 3 }, and {e\, e 2 }. In the presence of Kolmogorov's relative probability functions the relationships between our various relative probability functions on S may therefore be diagrammed as in Figure 2 below.
Since every relative probability function P in Kolmogorov's sense is a Popper one, its F-restriction (hence, the F-restriction P' of the function P in Theorem 14) is ensured by Theorem 5 to be a Popper (hence, a Kolmogorov) absolute probability function, or more specifically: a Carnap one if P is a Renyi function, a non-Carnap one otherwise. And it is easily verified that, where P' is a Popper (hence a Kolmogorov) absolute probability function, this function is a relative probability function in Kolmogorov's sense (a Renyi one if P' is a Carnap function, otherwise a non-Carnap one) and that it has P' as its Frestriction:
|Ί, if P'(£) =0

P(A,B) =\
[P'iA Π B)/P'(B) 9 otherwise.
So, a fifth relativization theorem:
Theorem 16 Kolmogorov's relative probability functions on S relativize Popper's (hence, Kolmogorov's) absolute probability functions on S.
This result, as indicated in Section 1, can be strengthened to:
Theorem 17 Kolmogorov's relative probability functions on S match oneto-one Popper's (hence, Kolmogorov's) absolute probability functions on S.
The argument needed to show that each of Popper's absolute probability functions is the F-restriction of exactly one relative probability function in Kolmogorov's sense is like that on pp. 495-496, but with Theorem 13(a) being substituted for Lemma I. We attended in Section 6 to those among Popper's relative probability functions that were not Renyi ones. Wrapping up that story, we attend here to those that are neither Renyi functions nor Kolmogorov ones.
Let P be an arbitrary relative probability function of Popper's on S that is neither a Renyi function nor a Kolmogorov one, and let P' be its F-restriction. By virtue of Theorem 5, P' is of course an absolute probability function of Popper's on S. Furthermore, since P does not meet RB6, there is a member of S, say D, other than A such that P(A,D) = 1 for every A in S and hence P(Λ,D) = 1. But P(Λ Π A V) = 0 by Lemma 2(h), Lemma 2(k), and BA, and hence P(A,D) X P(A V) = 0 by B4 and BA. So, P(A V) = 0, and hence P'(£>) = 0. And since P does not meet KB8 either, there is a member of S, say D\ such that V{D\ V) = 0 but P(Λ,£>') Φ 1, and hence such that P'(Z>') = 0 andsobyB3Z)'*Λ. But since ?(A,D) = 1 andP(Λ,D') Φ \,DΦD'. So, P' is an absolute probability function on S whose evaluation is 0 for at least two members of S other than A. Thus, those of Popper's relative probability functions that are neither Renyi nor Kolmogorov ones have as their F-restrictions absolute probability functions of Popper's that are not Carnap ones and whose evaluation is Ofor more than one argument other than A.
Our next theorem is an adaptation of Theorem 6. Note in connection with the definition of P given here that when B Π D Φ B, B Π D Φ A by BA and hence Έ>ί(B Γ) D) Φ 0 by CC4.
Theorem 18 Let P P be an absolute probability function of Popper's on S that is not a Carnap one and evaluates to Ofor at least two members D and D' of S distinct from A, let P£ be an absolute probability function of Carnap f s on S, and let P be this function on S:
Γl, ifBDD = B P(A,B) =\?ί>(A ΠJ?)/Pf>(B), ifBΠDΦBandPi>(B) Φθ
[Pfc((v4 ΠB)Π D)/P / c(B Π D), if B Π D Φ B but P P (£) = 0.
Then: (a) P 15 a relative probability function of Popper's on S; (b) P is not a Renyi one on S; (c) P is not a Kolmogorov one on S; (d) P has Pp as its V-restriction.
Proof of (a): That P meets each of B1-B4 and PB5, and hence is a relative probability function of Popper's on S, is established by cases. Case 1: P P (F Π D) = 0 by the hypothesis on P P (£>) and Lemma 4(f). So, VίΊ D Φ Vand P P (F) Φ 0 by C2. But P P (Λ Π V) = 0 by Lemma 4(e) and Lemma 4(f), and P P (F) = 1 by C2. So P meets Bl. So, a sixth relativization theorem:
Theorem 19
Those among Popper' 
s relative probability functions on S that are neither Renyi functions nor Kolmogorov ones relativize those among Popper's (and hence, Kolmogorov's) absolute probability functions on S that are not Carnap ones and evaluate to 0 for more than one member of S other than A.
We conclude this section with tables summarizing our relativization theorems and corollaries thereof. Table 6 covers the four types of Popper relative probability functions that are mutually exclusive; Table 7 covers the remaining six types. Table 6 are the results summarized in Table 7 . 
Popper's probability functions as defined on arbitrary sets
We deleted some of the Popper footnote that serves as the epigraph of this paper. The first sentence was of no concern to us, and the balance of the last might have misled the reader at that point. The sentence in its entirety runs as follows (the italics ours):
The relative systems published by me since 1955 are more general still than Renyi Now, Renyi's system is set-theoretical r , to be sure: the Boolean algebras on which his relative probability functions are defined, like those on which Kolmogorov's absolute probability functions are defined, must consist of sets. And the system is nonsymmetrical: since any function P of Renyi's is defined on the Cartesian product S x S' of two distinct sets, S a field (of sets) and S' a proper subset of S, P(A,B) will have a value but P(B,A) will not when B belongs to S' (and hence to S) but A belongs to 5 -S'. But these differences are not of the essence: Renyi's functions, as we understand them, are not necessarily set-theoretical, and-being total functions on S-they are symmetrical in Popper's sense. To us it is in two other respects, neither of which was mentioned by Popper, that his relative probability functions principally and most importantly differ from Renyi's:
(a) the Complementation Law they obey, PB5, is weaker than RB5, the one Renyi's functions do, and (b) as often stated in the preceding pages, they are defined on sets generally rather than Boolean algebras only, as are the absolute probability functions in [4] .
When in Sections 3 to 7 we presumed Popper's relative probability functions to be defined on Boolean algebras, we required them of course to meet PB5, thereby ensuring that a number of them -2 K° functions of them, to be precise -are not Renyi ones. And, as stated in Section 1, these 2*° functions are of particular significance, philosophical as well as mathematical. For instance, we showed in Section 4 that RB6, to wit: i.e., if member A and member B of S behave alike under P or -should you prefer-if A and B are indiscernible under P 9 then A and B are identical. 11 As a result, when P is a Popper function that is not a Renyi one, for each member of S there will be one or more other members of S indiscernible from it under P. This matter of indiscernibility versus identity and other consequences of (a) are studied in [8] and in [14] .
As Popper insisted with pride, (b) freed probability theory of its long dependence upon Boolean Algebra; hence, it freed the theory (i) when S consists of sets, of its long dependence upon the Boolean Algebra of sets, and (ii) when S consists of propositions, of its long dependence upon the Boolean Algebra of propositions, etc. As a matter of fact, it is (b), with S taken to consist of statements, which paved the way in the 70's for what is known as probabilistic semantics. 12 And (b) makes for extra Popper functions, 2*° relative ones and an equal number of absolute ones, a fact which to our knowledge is nowhere noted in the literature. Consider, for example, the three-membered set (a,b 9 Table 8 constitutes, as the reader may verify, a Popper relative probability function in the sense of [11] , and its F-restriction constitutes an absolute one in the sense of [9] . But [a 9 b,c] violates A3 and hence does not constitute a Boolean algebra in the sense of Section 2. Indeed, when A is a, B is b, and C is c, both A Π B and C Π C are c and hence A Π B = C Π C, but A Π B is b and hence AOBΦA.
Nor could [a,b,c] constitute a Boolean algebra in the sense of Section 2, since it is three-membered and a finite Boolean algebra in that sense has to be 2 Λ -membered for some n or other. Popper's functions defined on sets that are not Boolean algebras in the sense of Section 2 are unknown to, or at any rate ignored by, most probability theorists, this 30 years after the publication of [11] and 34 after that of [9] . 14 They demand immediate study. But long overdue in this paper is a formal account of the relative probability functions in [11] and the absolute ones in [9] , and a proof of the relativization theorem announced in the second paragraph of Section 1.
Let S be an arbitrary set closed under -and Π.
By a Popper relative probability function on S we understand any function P from S x S into the reals that meets constraints B1-B4 and PB5 plus these extra two, already mentioned in Section 3:
PB6 For any A, B, and C in S, P(,4 C\ B 9 C) <P(B Cι A,C)
PB7 For any ,4, B, and C in S, P(A,B Π C) < P(A,CΠB).
Definition 8.2
By a Popper absolute probability function on S we understand any function P from S into the reals that meets constraints C1-C3 plus these extra three, already mentioned in Section 5:
PC4 For any A and B in S, P(A ΠB)< P(B Π A) PC5 For any A, B, and C in S, P(v4 Π (B Π C)) < P((A Π B) Π C) PC6 For any A in 5, PM) < P(A Π A).
Note
It is because S here is an arbitrary set and hence need not meet constraints A1-A3 in Section 2 that the function P in Definition 8.1 is required to meet constraints PB6-PB7 and the one in Definition 8.2 is required to meet constraints PC4-PC6. PB6 amounts of course to P(A ΠB 9 
C)= P(B Γ)A,C) 9 PB7
toP(A 9 BΠC) = P(A 9 CΠB), and PC4 to Pμ Π B) = P(BΠA). As for Proof: P' meets C1-C3 for the same reasons as in the proof of Theorem 5, and meets PC4 by PB6, PC5 by Lemma 2(c), and PC6 by Lemma 2(g).
The function P in Theorem 21 is, as indicated in Note 10, a Kolmogorov function defined on an arbitrary set rather than on a Boolean algebra.
Theorem 21
Let P' be an absolute probability function of Popper Hence, our last relativization theorem:
Theorem 22
Popper's relative probability functions on S in the sense of Definition 8.1 relativize his absolute ones in the sense of Definition 8.2.
Lemma 2
Let P be a Popper relative probability function on S in either the sense of Definition 3.1 or that of Definition 8.1. 16 (<ι)0<P(A 9 B) < 1.
Proof: P(A 9 B) < 1 is trivially true when B is P-abnormal. So, suppose B is Pnormal. Then P(A 9 B) = 1 -P(A 9 B) by PB5, hence P(A 9 B) < 1 by B2, and hence (a) by B2 again. 
(f) IfCis P-normal, then P(A 9 C) = P(A ΠB 9 C) + P(A ΠB 9 C).
Proof: Suppose C is P-normal. By definition, when A Π C is P-abnormal, otherwise by PB5 P(B 9 A nc) + P(B 9 A n c) = P(C 9 A no + P(C 9 A n o, hence by (c) P(B 9 A ΠC)x P(A 9 C) + P(B 9 A Π C) X P(A 9 C) = P(A 9 C) + P(C 9 A ΠC)X P(A 9 C) 9 hence by B4, (e), and the hypothesis on C P(B ClA 9 C) + P(B ΠA 9 C) = P(A 9 C) 9 and so by either BA or PB6
P(A n B 9 C) + P(A nS 9 c) = P(A 9 C).
Hence (f). Proof: By definition when B is P-abnormal; otherwise, by (h), PB5, and the definition of F. (k) V is P-normal.
Proof: Suppose V is P-abnormal, and let A and B be arbitrary members of S. Then P(A ΠB 9 V) = 1, hence P(A 9 B Π F) x P(B 9 V) = 1 by B4, and hence P(A 9 B) = 1 by (b) and (j). So, contrary to Bl, P(A 9 B) = 1 for any A and B in S. Hence (k) by reductio.
Proof: By B4 and (j).
(m)PC4 ΠB,C) <P(ΛC) and?(A ΠB,C) <F(B,C).
Proof: Έ>(A <ΛB,C)< P(A 9 C) by B4 and (a), and hence P(A Π B,C) < P(5,C) by either BA or PB6.
(n)//P(v4,C) = 0, thenP(A ΠB 9 C) = P(BΠA,C) = 0.
Proof: By (m) and B2. Proo/; By (n) and (o).
Lemma 3
Let Vbea Carnap relative probability function on S. If P (Λ 9 A) = 1, then A =Λ.
Proof: Suppose P(Λ 9 A) = 1 (hyp. 1) and yet A Φ A (hyp. 2). P(A 9 V) Φ 0 by CB7 and hyp. 2. Hence P(Λ Π ^4, F) = P(Λ F) by Lemma 2(1) and hyp. 1. But P(Λ 9 V) = 0 by Lemma 2(h) and Lemma 2(k), and hence P(Λ Π A, V) = 0 by Lemma 2(n). Hence P(A 9 V) = 0, so A = A by reductio. Hence, if P(Λ,v4) = 1, then ^4 =Λ.
Lemma 4
Lei P be a Popper absolute probability function on S in either the sense of Definition 5.1 
or that of Definition 8.2. (a) P(A) = P(B Π A) + P(B Π A) = P(B Π Λ) + PM Π 5).
Proo/: By C3 and BA or PC4.
(b) P(A n (BΠ o) = P(U n 5) n c).
Proof: By BA when P is a Popper function in the sense of Definition 5.1. Otherwise, P(G4 n B) n c) = P(c n (A n B) ) (by PC4)
(by PC4), and hence (b) by C5.
(c)P(A ΠB) <PM) andP(A OB) < P(B).
Proof: P(A Π B) < P(yl) by C3 and Cl. Hence (c) by PC4.
(d)P(AΓ\A) = P(A).
Proof: By BA or by (c) and PC6. 
0)P(i) = i-pμ).
Proof:
(by C2 and C3)
p((c n (04 n ^) n c» n A) = P(C n (u r\B)nc)nA) (by (b» < P(((>1 ΠB)nC)ΠA) (by (c)) < P(^ϊ n ((,4 n 5) n c)) (by PC4) < p((i n μ n B)) n c) (by (b» <P(iίiμ Π J5»
(by (c» = 0
(by (h) and Cl).
(k) P(M n (en ((A rιB)n c))) n5) = o. Carnap himself refers to CB7" as the Axiom of Regularity, and to the functions that meet it as regular functions. As indicated on p. 486, what we understand here by Carnap's relative probability functions are generalizations of functions in [14] , and what is understood in Section 5 by Carnap's absolute probability functions are generalizations of functions in [4] and Section 57 of [2] . Carnap calls the former functions confirmation functions and the latter measure functions. In [3] Carnap studies confirmation functions that meet (among other constraints) counterparts of B2-B4 and RB5' but not of CB7, and hence are in our terminology Renyi functions rather than Carnap ones. (Incidentally, Bl follows from B2-B4 and RB5', though not from B2-B4 and RB5. That no counterpart of B3 is listed on p. 12 of [3] was an oversight on his part, as Carnap indicated in personal conversation.) In [4] , on the other hand, he studies confirmation functions that meet counterparts of B2-B4, RB5, and CB7 (pp. 101 ff.) as well, and hence are Carnap functions in our sense.
5. It is in order to preserve consistency that Popper requires B in PB5 to be P-normal. Suppose indeed that the restriction were lifted. Since P(A,A) = 1 by Lemma 1 in the Appendix, P(A,A) would equal 0 by PB5 and 1 by B3. The same contradiction would arise if B in RB5 could be A. As for RB5', the Finite Additivity Law of Note 3, suppose C there could be A. Since ACiA=AUA=A, P(A 9 A) -which equals 1 by B3-would equal 2 as well by RB5'. Renyi and Carnap block such contradictions by denying P(A,A) a value for any A in 5, hence for A and A. Intending to compare them with Popper's, we extend Renyi's and Carnap's relative probability functions to total ones and preserve consistency by merely requiring B in RB5 to be distinct from A. von Wright, whose relative probability functions are also total ones, preserves consistency by requiring A in B3 to be distinct from A. The resulting constraint is counterintuitive, and few have followed him in this. which is of course the F-restriction of RB5'. Given C1-C2, C3'and C3 are equivalent. So far as we know, credit for first using the autonomous C3 in place of the nonautonomous C3' goes to Popper (see [9] for what counts as an autonomous constraint). The switch paved the way for his autonomous characterization in [9] of absolute probability functions and in [11] of relative ones, and it paved the way of course for probabilistic semantics. Cl is known as the Nonnegativity Law and C2 as the Unit Normalization Law (for absolute probability functions), and C3 is called by Popper the Complementation Law (for absolute probability functions).
7. The reader should not infer from this proof that every Renyi function can be gotten from two absolute probability functions, one of them a Popper one and the other a Carnap one, or even that pairs of absolute probability functions match oneto-one Renyi's functions-the way Carnap's absolute probability functions match one-to-one his relative ones. Consider this function on the eight-membered set {Λ,tf,Z?,c,ά,Z?,c, F), where (e u e 2 , and e 3 being any three distinct elements you please) α, b, and c are {e λ }, {e 2 }, and {e 3 }, respectively, and hence ά, b, and c are This function is a Renyi one, and its F-restriction P P -read off the last column in the table-is of course an absolute probability function of Popper's which assigns value 0 to three members of our set besides A, to wit: a> b, and c. But there can be no absolute probability function P c of Carnap 8. The theorem also holds of all the partial functions in [12] and [13] that have a Frestriction. For by restricting the second argument of the function defined in Theorem 6 to the set S' (see Note 2) one obtains a partial function of the desired kind.
9. Let P' be an arbitrary absolute probability function of Carnap's, and let P(A 9 B) equal P'(A Π B)/P'(B) when P'{B) ψ 0, otherwise undefined. Then P proves by the same reasoning as above to be a Carnap relative probability function in the sense of [2] - [4] . So, Carnap's relative probability functions as he understood them relativize -indeed, match one-to-one -his absolute ones in [2] and [4] .
10. The partial Kolmogorov functions discussed on pp. 496-497 receive considerable attention in [5] and are the subject of [2] . The total ones obtained by setting P (A,B) 
